



Intergenerational risk sharing and labour supply in
collective funded pension schemes with deﬁned
beneﬁtsa
Jan Bonenkamp and Ed Westerhoutb
a We would like to thank Casper van Ewijk, Lex Meijdam, Theo Nijman, Luciano Greco, Roel Mehlkopf, Peter Broer and
Eduard Ponds for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Further, André Nibbelink is gratefully acknowledged
for helpful computational assistance.
b E-mail corresponding author: jpmb@cpb.nl
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s)CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, the Netherlands
Telephone +31 70 338 33 80
Telefax +31 70 338 33 50
Internet www.cpb.nl
ISBN 978-90-5833-463-3Abstract in English
In many countries, collective funded pension schemes with deﬁned beneﬁts (DB) are being
replaced by individual schemes with deﬁned contributions. Collective funded DB pensions may
indeed reduce social welfare. This will be the case when the schemes feature income-related
contributions that distort the labour-leisure decision. However, these schemes also share risks
between generations. This adds to welfare if these risks cannot be traded on capital markets.
This paper compares the welfare gains from intergenerational risk sharing with the welfare
losses that are due to labour market distortions. We adopt a two-period overlapping-generations
model for a small open economy with risky returns to equity holdings. We derive analytically
that the gains dominate the losses for the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences between labour and
leisure. Numerical simulations for the more general CES case conﬁrm these ﬁndings which also
withstand a number of other model modiﬁcations, like the introduction of a short-sale constraint
for households and the inclusion of a labour income tax. These results suggest that collective
funded schemes with well-organized risk sharing are preferable over individual schemes, even if
labour market distortions are taken into account.
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Abstract in Dutch
Het is algemeen bekend dat collectieve kapitaalgedekte pensioenstelsels die risico’s spreiden
over generaties, bijdragen aan een hogere welvaart. Het is evenwel minder bekend dat dergelijke
pensioenstelsels ook een verstorend effect hebben op de arbeidsaanbodbeslissing en langs die
route de welvaart juist kunnen verlagen. De reden hiervoor is dat pensioenpremies in veel
gevallen impliciete belastingen (of subsidies) bevatten die samenhangen met een discrepantie
tussen de risico’s waaraan pensioenvermogens en -verplichtingen blootgesteld zijn. Dit paper
weegt de voordelen van collectieve kapitaalgedekte pensioenstelsels in termen van risicodeling
af tegen de nadelen in termen van arbeidsmarktverstoring. Daartoe wordt een stochastisch model
ontwikkeld met twee overlappende generaties dat een kleine open economie (zoals de
Nederlandse) representeert. We vinden dat de welvaartswinsten van risicodeling veel groter zijn
dan de welvaartsverliezen van arbeidsmarktverstoringen. Dit resultaat is robuust voor een breed
scala aan alternatieve modelspeciﬁcaties, zoals de speciﬁcatie van de nutsfunctie, de
implementatie van een verbod om met geleend geld in aandelen te beleggen en de introductie
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6Summary
It is widely recognized that risk sharing across generations can be welfare improving.
Competitive ﬁnancial markets often fail to fully exploit the merits of intergenerational risk
sharing because current generations cannot sign insurance contracts with those who are not born
yet. This market incompleteness leaves a role for collective institutions like pension funds. By
offering collective contracts, pension funds are able to commit future generations to an
intergenerational risk-sharing scheme.
The key feature of these collective schemes is that they smooth shocks over and beyond the
lifetime of any single generation. A collective pension scheme makes intergenerational risk
sharing possible by disconnecting individual contributions to individual beneﬁts. Because in
most real-world pension plans contributions are related to labour income, this disconnection
between contributions and beneﬁts distorts the labour supply decision. The aim of this paper is
to trade the advantages of funded collective pensions in terms of intergenerational risk sharing
against its drawbacks that are due to labour market distortions.
This trade-off is analysed with a stochastic overlapping-generations model that represents a
small open economy. The economy is subject to macroeconomic capital-market risk. There are
two overlapping generations, a young generation that is active in the labour market and an old
generation which is retired. The young generation decides upon the amount of private savings,
labour supply and the portfolio allocation in order to maximize expected lifetime utility. The
pension fund offers risk-free beneﬁts and raises state-contingent contributions proportional to
labour income. Given the optimal behavioural responses of the consumer, the pension fund acts
as a benevolent Stackelberg leader by optimally choosing its portfolio allocation in order to
maximize (ex ante) social welfare.
The source of market incompleteness that justiﬁes the existence of the collective pension
fund in the model is the inability of generations to trade risks before they are born. By deﬁning
beneﬁts independently from realized ﬁnancial returns, the pension fund facilitates opportunities
for intergenerational risk sharing that agents cannot undo through transactions in ﬁnancial
markets. In this way, the pension fund creates an opportunity for the young generation to
exchange ﬁnancial risk with the old generation ex ante, which reduces market incompleteness.
This young generation is better equipped to bear capital-market risk than the old generation
because they can use their human capital (which is assumed to be risk free in our model) to
absorb ﬁnancial shocks and they still have the ﬂexibility to adjust their labour supply. When
there is no collective pension arrangement, the old generation only has ﬁnancial wealth as
consumption source which makes them vulnerable for ﬁnancial shocks.
For a speciﬁc utility function we analytically show that the introduction of a collective
funded scheme with deﬁned beneﬁts and state-contingent contributions involves an ex ante
Pareto improvement. The beneﬁt of this risk-sharing pension scheme is not to reduce risk but
7rather to increase the expected pay-off from risky investments by generations who have not
entered the labour market yet. We ﬁnd that the welfare gains from intergenerational risk sharing
outweigh the losses from labour market distortions. Using numerical simulations, we show that
this result also holds for more general utility functions. However, we also ﬁnd that proportional
transfers reduce the risk-bearing capacity of the working generation because they introduce a
positive correlation between returns on ﬁnancial assets and labour income.
The results of this paper have an important implication related to the current pension reforms
worldwide. Due to increasing demographic pressure, in various countries collective deﬁned
beneﬁt pension schemes are being replaced by individual deﬁned contribution systems, in which
beneﬁts are subject to various types of risk. Our result emphasizes that individual pension
schemes that do not share risks among generations are not optimal, even if we take care of the
potential labour market distortions that are related to collective funded pension schemes.
81 Introduction
In the industrialized world, population ageing and the current ﬁnancial crisis jeopardize the
sustainability of public ﬁnances. Consequently, many countries are reforming or planning to
reform their social security systems. Various countries are gradually reducing their
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in favour of more funded-based systems. In other countries with
traditionally large funded systems, like Australia, Switzerland, the United States and the
Netherlands, we observe a clear trend away from collective deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) systems
towards individual deﬁned-contribution (DC) systems. Currently DC schemes represent 42% of
total pension assets, compared to 40% in 2004 and 32% in 1999 (Towers Watson (2010)). This
move to DC schemes is a global trend, driven largely by ﬁnancial considerations, as sponsors
seek to take control of both the volatility and the overall cost of their DB plans.
A priori it is not immediately clear that a movement from collective funded DB pensions
towards individual funded DC pensions will improve social welfare. On the one hand, collective
funded DB pension schemes allow for welfare-improving intergenerational risk sharing wich
better protect workers for sizeable downturns of ﬁnancial markets. As demonstrated in e.g.
Gordon and Varian (1988), Shiller (1999) and Gottardi and Kubler (2006), in competitive
ﬁnancial markets currently living generations are not able to share risks with those who are not
born yet. Mandatory participation in a collective funded DB pension scheme can (at least partly)
solve this market incompleteness. The main feature of such a pension scheme is that it smoothes
shocks over and beyond the lifetime of a single generation by disconnecting individual
contributions from individual beneﬁts.
On the other hand, collective funded DB pensions often involve distortions on labour
markets, an aspect that certainly decreases welfare. In most real-world pension plans, pension
contributions are related to labour income.1 A disconnection between individual contributions
and beneﬁts then implies that the contribution rate contains an implicit tax or subsidy which
distorts the labour supply decision. The aim of this paper is to trade the advantage of collective
funded DB pensions in terms of intergenerational risk sharing against the drawback of a labour
market distortion.
The risk-sharing characteristics of alternative pension and social security systems have
recently gained increasing attention in the literature. Much of these papers focus on PAYG
schemes (see, e.g., Krueger and Kubler (2006), Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martín (2006),
Miles and ˘ Cerný (2006), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Fehr and Habermann (2008)).
Some recent papers also look at the role of funded pension schemes in facilitating
1 Since individual abilities are unobservable, policy makers (or pension funds) necessarily use observable wages to
distribute shocks. Wage-related contributions can also be justiﬁed from constant relative risk aversion. In that case,
optimal risk sharing implies that shocks should be distributed proportionally over pension members, based on total wealth
(Bovenberg et al. (2007)). One way to implement this is to use income-related contributions.
9intergenerational risk sharing (see, e.g., Beetsma et al. (2008), Bovenberg et al. (2007), Cui et al.
(2006), Gollier (2008), Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) and Teulings and de Vries (2006)).
Although these papers differ in the way risk sharing is designed, they all conclude that funded
pension schemes allow for substantial welfare gains. However, none of these studies compares
these gains with the losses due to labour market distortions.
To analyse this trade-off, we consider a model that represents a small open economy
populated with two overlapping generations and a collective pension fund. The economy is
subject to macroeconomic capital-market risk. The old generation is retired, while the young
generation is active in the labour market. The two overlapping generations cannot trade risks
because the young is not able to participate in the capital market before shocks occur. The young
generation decides upon the amount of private saving, labour supply and the portfolio allocation
in order to maximize expected lifetime utility. The pension fund provides risk-free beneﬁts and
raises state-contingent contributions proportional to individual labour income. Hence, the young
generation bears the full mismatch risk between the beneﬁt guarantees provided to the old and
the accumulated pension assets. Labour is assumed to be perfectly immobile so that agents are
not able to avoid implicit taxes by moving abroad. Taking into account the behavioural response
of the consumer to its actions, the pension fund optimally chooses the portfolio allocation in
order to maximize an (ex ante) social welfare function.
This paper provides some interesting results. For a speciﬁc utility function we analytically
show that the introduction of a collective funded scheme with deﬁned beneﬁts and
state-contingent contributions involves an ex ante Pareto improvement. Using numerical
simulations, we show that this result also holds for more general utility functions. As
demonstrated by Gollier (2008), the beneﬁts of risk sharing do not only imply a lower level of
risk, but also show up in a different guise. Indeed, in his and our paper, households react to the
risk reduction that is due to the risk-sharing scheme by shifting their portfolios towards equity.
This increases the average rate of return that households earn on their portfolios and increases
the welfare gain from the pension scheme. The present paper adds that households may also
choose a different combination of labour and leisure, thereby even further increasing the welfare
gain from risk sharing.
In addition, we ﬁnd that labour supply ﬂexibility decreases the risk appetite of consumers if
pension contributions are distortionary. This result contrasts with existing studies on the
interaction between labour supply and portfolio choice (see e.g. Bodie et al. (1992), Choi and
Shim (2006) and Farhi and Panageas (2007)). These studies show that labour supply ﬂexibility
offers insurance against adverse shocks which justiﬁes more risky asset portfolios. The idea is
that income effects in labour supply behaviour cause a negative correlation between asset returns
and labour income allowing individuals to take more risk. This paper, however, shows that
income-related intergenerational transfers also introduce substitution effects. These substitution
effects work in the opposite direction and generate a positive correlation between labour income
10and asset returns. Hence, labour supply is subject to pro-cyclical pressure which reduces the
risk-bearing capacity of consumers.
The results of this paper are relevant for the worldwide pension reform towards the
establishment of individual DC-type schemes. Indeed, our results emphasize that individual
pension schemes that do not share risks among generations may not be optimal. Collective
funded schemes with well-structured intergenerational risk sharing are preferable from a welfare
point of view, even if the losses from labour market distortions are taken into account.
A few other studies are related to the present study. Mehlkopf (2009) assesses also the labour
market distortions from collective funded schemes, but relates them to the gains of a different
kind of market incompleteness. Indeed, he focuses on the inability of individual agents to
borrow against their human capital. He shows that the welfare costs of recovery policies (due to
labour market distortions) are smaller than the associated welfare gains (due to the alleviation of
borrowing constraints). Also related is Draper and Westerhout (2009) who, like us, conclude that
the gains from intergenerational risk sharing dominate the losses from labour market distortions.
Their model is multi-period and allows for a more detailed modelling of household behaviour.
However, they do not present analytical solutions and they do not optimize on the investment
policy of the pension fund, as we do here.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the model.
Section 3 derives an analytical solution for the ex ante welfare gain of the pension scheme in
case of a Cobb-Douglas felicity function in consumption and leisure. Section 4 decomposes the
derived welfare gain into the gain due to risk sharing and the loss due to the labour supply
distortion. Section 5 presents numerical simulation results for the more general version of the
model that allows the intratemporal substitution elasticity to be lower or higher than one. This
section also explores the welfare consequences of a short-sale constraint for households and of
the inclusion of a labour income tax. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
11122 Model
We consider an economy populated with two overlapping generations of households and a
collective pension fund. Each generation is modelled as a representative household who
consumes in the two periods of his life and can supply labour when young. We abstract from
demographic risk: all generations are equally large (normalized at unity). There are two ﬁnancial
assets in the economy, a risk-free bond and risky equity. We will jointly optimize on the
investment policy of the pension fund and on household behaviour in terms of consumption,
labour supply and portfolio allocation. The model represents a small open economy for which
factor prices (the wage rate, the risk-free interest rate and the rate of return on equity) can be
taken as given. As usual, capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile and labour is perfectly
immobile.
The added value of the pension is that it alleviates the distortion of a missing market, i.e. the
market for risks that occur before a generation is born. In particular, by providing safe beneﬁts to
the elderly, investing savings (partly) in equity and imposing the mismatch risk between assets
and liabilities upon young generations, the pension fund lets young generations share in risks in
which they cannot trade on the private capital market. The creation of a new asset will, if
supplied in the right amount, increase the welfare of all generations that participate in the
scheme.
2.1 Timing
The sequence of events is graphically shown in Figure 2.1. At the beginning of period t, a shock
occurs in the equity rate of return (Re;t). After this shock has revealed, ﬁrst the pension fund
decides on the contribution rate (pt) and the portfolio share (lp;t) to be invested in equity. The
pension fund acts as a benevolent Stackelberg leader, taking into account the future reactions of
households to its decisions. An important property of the model is that the portfolio choice of
the pension fund at time t only affects lifetime utility of the next generation, born in t +1. As















13visually emphasized with an arrow in Figure 2.1, this dependency is driven by the direct impact
of the pension fund’s equity investment on next period’s contribution rate. After the actions of
the pension fund, the consumers decide upon their private savings (St), the amount of leisure (Lt)
and the portfolio share (lh;t) to be invested in equity, taking the pension contribution rate as
given. The decisions of the consumers are based on the distribution of the future asset return.
Since future pension beneﬁts are safe, consumers only face uncertainty about the return on their
private savings.
2.2 Households
Agents derive utility from consumption and leisure. The preference structure is represented by a
time-separable, nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function that separates the
aversion to risk and to intertemporal variation (Epstein and Zin (1991)). This separation is
important for the analysis of pension contracts that alter both the risk properties and the timing












; g > 0; q > 0 (2.1)
whereC1;t and Lt denote consumption and leisure when young at time t,C2;t+1 denotes
consumption when old at time t +1 and b is the time discount factor. The parameters q and g
deﬁne the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity.2 When g = q, equation (2.1) reduces to a standard expected utility formation where no
distinction is made between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. The felicity function







1 r for r > 0; r 6= 1
C1 hLh for r = 1
(2.2)
with 0 < h < 1. The inverse of the intratemporal substitution elasticity is given by r; the utility
parameter h governs the relative preference for leisure. In the following, we will use the
following shorthand notation: u1;t  u(C1;t;Lt) and u2;t+1  u(C2;t+1;1).
There are two assets in the economy, a risk-free asset with return Rf and a risky asset with
return Re. When young, agents start to save out of their labour income (they enter the economy
with zero endowment of assets). They determine the portfolio allocation by choosing a share lh;t
of private savings to invest in the risky asset and a share 1 lh;t to invest in the risk-free asset.






2 The parameters q and g deﬁne risk aversion and the aversion to intertemporal substitution with respect to total
consumption, i.e. consumption of goods and leisure. Risk aversion and aversion to intertemporal substitution for the two
goods separately will be deﬁned below.
14We impose that the log return on the risky asset in excess of the log risk-free return, i.e.
log(1+Re) log(1+Rf), is an independently and identically distributed normal variable with
mean m and variance s2.
When young, an agent spends a fraction Lt of his time endowment on leisure. We normalize
the time endowment at unity, so that 0  Lt  1. A fraction pt of labour income is contributed to
the pension fund; the rest is devoted to consumption and private saving St. During the second
period, the agent is retired. Consumption in this period consists of a labour-related pension
beneﬁt (1 Lt)B, where B denotes the maximum attainable level and the factor 1 Lt reﬂects








whereY denotes the wage rate, which is assumed to be constant over time.3
Maximizing the objective function, equation (2.1), subject to the intertemporal budget

























































Equation (2.5a) is the Euler equation which equalizes the marginal utility of ﬁrst-period
consumption to the discounted expected marginal utility of second-period consumption.
Equation (2.5b) is the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to leisure, while equation (2.5c) is the
condition for optimal portfolio allocation.
The Euler equation speciﬁes a relation between the marginal utility of consumption and the























deﬁnes the stochastic discount factor (SDF). The SDF measures the marginal value of a unit of
consumption next period per unit of current consumption. The term in square brackets enters
because of non-expected utility and compares next-period utility with its certainty-equivalent
counterpart. A consumer that is relatively risk averse (q > g) has a certainty-equivalent utility
that is lower than expected utility.4 That is, the consumer applies a correction factor to next
3 Non-stochastic wages can go together with stochastic equity returns if i) there is depreciation risk and no productivity
risk and ii) the production function is linear in capital and labour implying an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution.





1 q < Et u2;t+1.
15period’s marginal utility which is less than one on average, implying that he discounts the future
more heavily on average than an expected-utility consumer.
The equation for the SDF can be used to derive a few more relations, which we will apply

















; i = f;e (2.7)









= Et mt+1 (2.9)
2.3 Pension fund
We consider a collective pension fund scheme in which households are obliged to participate.
Switching from obligatory participation to voluntary participation could give rise to
discontinuity problems. These problems will be discussed later on.
The pension fund collects contributions from the young generation, invests these
contributions in the capital market and pays out beneﬁts to the same generation in the second
period of life. The maximal attainable pension beneﬁt B is risk free and deﬁned as:
B = aY (2.10)
with a the replacement rate. Recall that the pension contract is related to labour history so that
the actual pension beneﬁt paid out to the old generation at time t +1 equals (1 Lt)B.
The pension fund invests the collected pension contributions in the risk-free asset and the
risky asset. It invests a share lp;t of the contributions in the risky asset and the remaining part
1 lp;t in the risk-free asset. The portfolio return of the pension fund Rp is thus equal to:
Rp;t+1 = (1 lp;t)Rf +lp;tRe;t+1 (2.11)
If the pension fund chooses a risky investment strategy (i.e. lp;t 6= 0), the contribution rate
expressed as percentage of the wage rate (pt) consists of two parts: a cost-effective component
(pb;t) and a recovery component (pc;t) reﬂecting the mismatch risk between liabilities and assets,
i.e. pt = pb;t +pc;t. From an ex ante point of view, the pension scheme is a fair deal if the
cost-effective component of the contribution rate is equal to the value the participant attaches to






16Equation (2.12) is the funding condition which ensures that the pension contract does not
contain ex ante redistribution. Solving for the cost-effective component of the contribution rate,





Let us now focus upon the recovery component, pc;t. This component reﬂects the transfers
that the young generation will make to or receive from the old generation. In case of a funding
deﬁcit, the recovery rate is positive and the young generation effectively makes a payment to the
retired generation. In case of a funding surplus, this rate is negative and it is the old generation
who makes a transfer to the young generation. Hence, risk sharing is restricted to only two
overlapping generations. The solvency constraint for the pension fund thus equals:
(1+Rp;t+1)pb;t(1 Lt)Y +pc;t+1(1 Lt+1)Y = B(1 Lt)
This equation says that the pension fund ﬁnances pension beneﬁts in period t +1 (that reﬂects
the rights accumulated in period t) with cost-effective premiums levied in period t, the portfolio
return earned on this in period t +1 and an intergenerational transfer levied in period t +1 on the
basis of period t +1 labour supply. Hence, risk sharing is conﬁned to two overlapping
generations. As one model period represents roughly twenty years, the potential for risk sharing
is maximized at forty years. This is not unrealistic if we look at risk-sharing mechanisms in
actual pension schemes, which are often restricted by rigid solvency regimes.
Using equations (2.10), (2.11) and (2.13), we can convert the solvency constraint into an








where Nt  pb;tlp;t (1 Lt)Y is the absolute amount of collected contributions invested in equity.
For this pension scheme to be sustainable, we must have that pc;t+1 < 1. Otherwise the young
generation is not always able to guarantee a safe beneﬁt to the old generation. Later on, when we
solve the model, we will derive the necessary and sufﬁcient condition such that pc;t+1 < 1. Note
from equation (2.14) that pc;t+1 = 0 if the pension fund does not invest in equity. Further, note
that the average transfer is negative: even if the rate of return on equity happens to be equal to its
mean, there is a non-zero transfer which reﬂects the risk premium on equity. Since the
intergenerational transfer is related to income of the young, it serves on average as an implicit
subsidy to labour supply.
The pension fund uses its investment policy (Nt) to maximize social welfare. Due to the
simple model structure, this boils down to a static optimization problem. The only
intergenerational link in the model is the recovery rate. As already shown in Figure 2.1, the
portfolio decision of the pension fund at time t only affects lifetime utility of the generation born
at t +1   through its direct impact on the intergenerational transfer. This property is a
17consequence of the utility-based valuation of the cost-effective contribution rate which is based
on the risk-free return (and not the portfolio return!). Hence, both the beneﬁt of a risky
investment strategy at time t (i.e. a higher expected portfolio return) and the mismatch risk
between assets and liabilities only shows up in the transfer of a single generation which is young
at time t +1.
For the benevolent pension fund who aims to maximize expected utility of all currently living
and future generations, it it therefore sufﬁcient to maximize ex ante lifetime utility of one
representative generation, i.e. lifetime utility evaluated before the occurrence of the shock in the
ﬁrst period of the life of the household and based upon the distribution of shocks in the two
periods of his life. Consequently, if the investment strategy of the pension fund improves welfare
for this single generation, the policy is automatically a Pareto improvement. The pension fund







subject to the solvency constraint (2.14) and the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household,
equations (2.5a)-(2.5c).
183 Solution
For Cobb-Douglas felicity utility (r = 1) the model can be solved analytically. In the
simulations later on, we will present results for the general model in which we can play around
with the intratemporal substitution elasticity. In case of Cobb-Douglas utility, the ﬁrst-order








































where we used equation (2.7) to substitute out the stochastic portfolio return Rh;t+1 for the
risk-free return Rf.
Equations (3.1a) to (3.1c) include the parameters y  1 (1 h)(1 g) > 0,
w  1 h(1 g) > 0, z  1 (1 h)(1 q) > 0 and n  (q  g)=(1 q). The parameters y
and w are the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity with respect to consumption and
leisure, respectively; z denotes the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion with respect to
consumption and n reﬂects the importance of non-expected utility.
3.1 Consumer problem















Note that the portfolio share at relates the household’s investment in equity to its total wealth,
which is deﬁned as the sum of ﬁnancial wealth and pension wealth. As a result, RT;t+1 is the









Since shocks in Re;t+1 are independently and identically distributed, there is a unique solution to




19where ¯ m = m + 1
2s2 is the expectation of the excess return on the risky asset. Equation (3.6) is
similar to the result obtained by Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969). The portfolio fraction
invested in the risky asset is increasing in the expected excess return of the risky asset and
decreasing in the variance of the excess return and the preference from consumption smoothing
as measured by relative risk aversion z.5 In the limit of continuous time with continuous paths
for asset prices, equation (3.6) is exact (Campbell and Viceira (2002)).
To solve for consumption and leisure demand, we ﬁrst substitute the budget constraint (3.2)










t (1+ ¯ R)1 y 1
y (3.7)







The CE rate of return is the return on a hypothetical risk-free investment strategy that provides
individuals the same expected utility level as they receive from optimally investing their wealth
into the tradable risk-free and risky asset.6 Since it is assumed that the equity return is
independently and identically distributed, the CE rate of return can be treated as an
unconditional expectation. In Appendix A.2 we show that this return is approximately equal to:





If the risky asset offers no excess return (¯ m = 0), agents will not invest in the risky asset so that
the CE rate of return is equal to the risk-free return. In the more interesting case in which ¯ m > 0,
the CE rate of return exceeds the risk-free rate of return. The second term on the right-hand side
of equation (3.9) is the risk premium of the market portfolio. It follows that d ¯ R=d ¯ m > 0 and
d ¯ R=ds2 < 0. Hence, if the expected excess return increases, the CE rate of return also increases.
When uncertainty increases, however, the CE return decreases.
Dividing (3.1b) by equation (3.1a) shows that the marginal rate of substitution between






5 In Appendix A.1 we show that ¯ m  E(Re  Rf) and s2  Var(Re  Rf).

















where the last step follows from ﬁrst-order condition (3.5).
20Only the recovery rate shows up in the price of leisure, because, by construction, the
cost-effective contribution rate is equal to the utility-based value of the accrued pension
entitlement (that is, the cost-effective contribution rate is actuarially fair). Using equation (3.10),













We can deﬁne Zt as an implicit equation that only depends on exogenous variables and structural












We assume that this equation has a unique and positive solution for Z. Note that this solution is
constant over time.
The solution for consumption enables us to solve for the fraction of private savings invested








If the pension fund increases the cost-effective contribution rate it levies upon workers, workers
respond by increasing the fraction of private savings that they invest in the risky asset. Since the
pension beneﬁt is risk free, the cost-effective contribution is equivalent to an investment in the
risk-free asset. Agents counteract the actions of the pension fund with their private savings in
such a way that   in terms of total wealth   the investment in the risky asset is constant. This
offsetting response will be reinforced when agents are confronted with a positive surcharge
(pc;t > 0), because in that case the share of ﬁnancial wealth in total wealth declines. To ensure
that the stock of risky asset holdings in total wealth does not change, agents invest a larger share
of ﬁnancial wealth in the risky asset. Note that lh;t can be larger than unity. In that case, the
worker goes short in bonds to buy risky equity.
Equation (3.14) can be used to derive the effect of uncertainty on the consumption and













Using the deﬁnition of y, it can be shown that equation (3.16) is positive for g < 1, negative for
g > 1 and zero for g = 1. Recall from equation (3.9) that d ¯ R=d ¯ m > 0 and d ¯ R=ds2 < 0. Hence,
if g > 1, Z increases if s2 increases, implying that ﬁrst-period consumption and leisure both
decrease. This corresponds to the case that the negative income effect on consumption
21dominates the positive substitution effect (Sandmo (1970)). The additional savings can then be
viewed as a self-insurance on capital markets against future income risk (i.e. precautionary
savings). Similarly, Z decreases if ¯ m increases, leading to higher ﬁrst-period consumption and
leisure. If g < 1, the substitution effect of a change in the CE rate of return dominates the
corresponding income effect, thereby reversing the signs of dZ=d ¯ m and dZ=ds2.
The constancy of Z has some important implications. First, note from equation (3.13) that
labour supply is a constant. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation that features a zero
uncompensated labour supply elasticity. Hence, we omit the time index of labour supply in the
rest of the section. Second, it implies that ﬁrst-period consumption is a constant fraction of
lifetime income (1 pc;t)Y.
3.2 Pension fund problem
To derive the optimal policy of the pension fund we need to specify the indirect utility function
for young agents. Substitution of the solution for consumption, equation (3.11) and










Inserting this function together with the recovery rate, equation (2.14), in the objective function











Note that condition (3.18) has exactly the same structure as the optimality condition of the
portfolio choice of households, see equation (3.5). This implies that alp;t = at so that equation









Equation (3.20) describes the pension fund’s absolute investment in equity. Each period the
pension fund invests a ﬁxed amount in the risky asset. Like households, the pension fund invests
a smaller amount in the risky asset if risk aversion increases (higher z), reﬂecting the higher
preference for consumption smoothing across states of nature. Note that the absolute amount of
equity exposure in the pension fund portfolio does not depend on the accrual rate a. For lower
(higher) values of a, the fund collects relatively less (much) pension contributions. In these
cases, the pension fund will invest a larger (smaller) share l p of the contributions in the risky
asset so that its risk exposure in absolute terms is left unchanged.






Hence, as long as ¯ m < zs2, the pension scheme is always sustainable. That is, the young
generation will in any case be able to provide safe beneﬁts to the old generation.
3.3 Welfare measure
In this section, we show that the collective DB pension scheme involves an ex ante Pareto
improvement compared to the situation without a collective pension scheme. We denote this
benchmark situation as the individual DC system. We measure the welfare change as an
income-equivalent variation: we ask with how much the labour income of the representative
agent (x) should be increased in the situation without a pension scheme in order to make him
indifferent between participating in the funded pension scheme or not. We answer this question
from an ex ante perspective, i.e., before an agent knows the state of nature in the ﬁrst period of
life. Positive numbers thus indicate welfare gains and negative numbers welfare losses. Let
W0() denote ex ante indirect utility in case there is no collective pension scheme andW1() ex












If ¯ m = 0, then it follows from equation (3.22) that x = 0: if the expected excess return of the
risky asset is zero, the pension fund will not invest in this asset, thereby eliminating the scope for
intergenerational risk sharing. As long as the expected excess return is positive (¯ m > 0), the
pension will invest in the risky asset so that households can capture the equity premium which is
welfare enhancing (x > 0).
To show that this pension scheme is Pareto-improving, suppose that the pension scheme is
introduced at time t. Then the generations born before time t+1 are obviously indifferent
between the case with and without a pension fund. The young generation at time t only
contributes the cost-effective rate pb;t of disposable income to the pension fund. Since there are
no intergenerational transfers in t (i.e. pc;t = 0), we have that the utility of this generation also
7 For brevity, we suppress the time index t: the welfare change from the introduction of the pension scheme is
independent of the initial state.
23remains unaffected. The generations born at the beginning of time t+1 and beyond, beneﬁt
from the introduction of the pension scheme. The reform is thus Pareto-improving.
The welfare gain is increasing with the reward for risk taking (¯ m=s) and decreasing with the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (z). From equation (3.20) it follows that a higher reward for
risk taking increases the intergenerational payments and hence, raises the scope for
intergenerational risk sharing. For higher degrees of risk aversion, in turn, it follows from
equation (3.20) that the pension fund invests a smaller amount in the risky asset. As a
consequence, the scope for intergenerational risk sharing decreases, resulting in lower welfare
gains.
Interestingly, equation (3.22) does not depend on the pension fund size a. In the most
extreme case, in which a = 0, the pension fund does not collect cost-effective contributions from
the young at all but still provides a welfare gain of x. In this situation, the pension fund explicitly
takes short positions in safe assets to buy stocks on behalf of future generations (Teulings and
de Vries (2006)). However, if we introduce short-sale constraints on investment behaviour of
consumers, equation (3.15), or the pension fund, equation (3.19), this independency between the
welfare gain and the pension fund size breaks down, as will be discussed in Section 5.6.
244 Lump sum transfers
To disentangle the welfare gains from intergenerational risk sharing from the labour market
distortions associated with income-related intergenerational transfers, we now solve the model in










. Deﬁned in this way, a positive transfer (Tt > 0) implies that an agent
receives a transfer from the pension fund, a negative transfer (Tt < 0) means that an agent pays a
transfer to the pension fund. With lump sum transfers, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
consumption, equation (3.1a), and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to optimal portfolio
allocation, equation (3.5), do not change, implying that a = ¯ m=zs2 continues to hold true. The

















Combining (4.1) with (3.1a) gives the result that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption equals the gross wage rate rather than the wage rate after pension contributions





















with Zt already deﬁned in equation (3.7).
Equations (4.3)-(4.5) are no closed-form solutions in the sense that their right-hand sides
contain endogenous variables. Indeed, Zt is a function of leisure which in case of lump sum
transfers is not a constant. As a consequence, it is not possible in general to solve for the optimal
investment policy of the pension fund analytically. Only for a particular case, when lifetime
utility is log-linear in ﬁrst-period and second-period consumption and leisure (i.e.
g = q = r = 1), is it possible to get closed-form expressions and to derive the optimal pension
fund policy. In the case of log-linear lifetime utility, Zt is constant and does not depend on
leisure. Appendix A.4 shows that for log-linear lifetime utility the optimal pension fund policy is









Comparing solution (4.7) with the solution in case of distortionary transfers, see equation (3.20)
with g = q = r = 1, it follows that in the latter case the pension fund invests a smaller amount in
the risky asset. In the numerical simulations, later on, it will be shown that this result also holds
if g = q = r = 1 does not apply.
If contributions relate to labour income, the intergenerational payments introduce a
substitution effect in the labour supply decision. This substitution effect creates a positive
correlation between labour income and asset returns, because if equity returns drop down, the
pension fund has to increase the contribution rate which reduces the price of leisure, depresses
labour supply and hence, reduces labour income. This procyclical pressure on labour supply
behaviour reduces the risk-bearing capacity of consumers leading to lower equity investments of
the pension fund in case of income-dependent transfers. As discussed in the introduction, this
result differs from the existing literature on the interaction between labour supply and portfolio
selection (see e.g. Bodie et al. (1992)).
For the case of log-linear lifetime utility, the welfare gain can be decomposed into the
welfare gain from risk sharing and the welfare loss from the labour market distortion associated
with the recovery rate. Let us denote xL as the income-equivalent variation for lump sum
transfers expressed as percentage of labour income: it measures the additional amount of income
that should be given to an agent in the situation without a pension scheme in order to make him












We deﬁne the labour market distortion (xD) as the difference between the income-equivalent
variation in the presence of proportional transfers and that in the presence of lump sum transfers,









Note that xD < 0 is negative, implying that the welfare gain from risk sharing is larger in case of
lump sum transfers than in case of proportional transfers. From equation (4.9), it follows that if
the share of leisure expenditures in total expenditures increases (higher h), the welfare loss
associated with the labour market distortion increases. In addition, if more weight is given to
future consumption (higher b), the welfare loss decreases. The reason is that the labour market
distortion only affects ﬁrst-period consumption since people are retired in the second period.
8 See Appendix A.4 for the derivation.
265 Simulations
5.1 Numerical procedure
This section reports on numerical simulations with the model. There are two reasons for
switching to numerical simulation. First, the model version with CES preferences (r 6= 1) cannot
be solved explicitly for optimal consumption, asset accumulation, labour supply and the optimal
pension fund policy. Second, in the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences (r = 1), the computation
of an analytical solution involves some approximation of the portfolio choice. Indeed, the
derivations of the portfolio choices and the welfare gain are based on an approximation of the
log portfolio return which exactly holds in continuous time, but becomes somewhat less accurate
over longer time intervals (Barberis (2000)). To illustrate, based on the numerical approach we
calculate an equity share in the individual portfolio of 25%, whereas a calculation based on the
approximate analytical solution (3.6) gives an equity share of 27%.9
We use Monte Carlo simulation methods to solve the ﬁrst-order conditions (2.5a)-(2.5c) of
the consumer and ﬁrst-order condition (3.18) of the pension fund. Recall that equation (3.18)
only solves the pension fund problem for Cobb-Douglas utility. In case of CES utility, we will
use grid search to compute to what extent the Cobb-Douglas solution must be adapted to obtain
the CES optimum.
In solving the individual optimization problem, individuals form rational expectations based
on the true distribution of variables. So in each period a young agent makes a decision, based on
the state variable at that time (which is the net wage rate) in such a way that the ﬁrst-order
conditions are satisﬁed and expectations are based on the assumed distributions of next-period
random variables. We will use 2,000 realized paths of the equity return to compute the
distribution of the endogenous stochastic variables. This seems a natural choice in the trade-off
between sufﬁcient accuracy of the results and very long computer running time.10
5.2 Model parameters
The key parameters in the model are the utility parameters, i.e., the time discount factor (b), the
(inverse of the) intertemporal substitution elasticity (g), the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
(q), the parameter governing the relative preference for leisure (h) and the (inverse of the)
intratemporal substitution elasticity (r). The rest of the parameters involve the replacement rate
(a), the risk-free rate of return (Rf), the wage rate (Y) and, ﬁnally, the mean and standard
deviation of the stochastic equity return. Table 5.1 provides the values for these parameters used
9 To derive equation (3.6), we assume that 1+RT is lognormally distributed (see appendix A). This is not completely true
because 1+RT is a linear combination of the risk-free return 1+Rf and the lognormally distributed equity return 1+Re.
10 See Appendix B for more details.
27Table 5.1 Benchmark parameterization
Parameter q g h r b a Rf E(Re) Stdev(Re) Y
Value 5 2 0.5 1 0.8 0.4 0.02 0.05 0.20 1
The risk-free return and the mean and standard deviation of the equity return are annual ﬁgures.
in the baseline scenario.
In our model economy, agents live for two periods. Therefore, we interpret one model period
to last twenty years. Like in van Hemert (2005), we set the time discount factor at b = 0:8 in the
baseline calculation, which corresponds to an annual time discount rate of 1.1%. We choose as
benchmark an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5 (i.e. g = 2) and an intratemporal
substitution of r = 1. An intertemporal substitution elasticity of one half is commonly used in
the macro and public ﬁnance literature and it lies well within the range of available estimates
(e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1995) or Blundell et al. (1994)). We set the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion at q = 5. The calibrated share parameter h is set at 0.5 and the risk-free return (Rf)
is set at 2% per year, implying that the the twenty-year return is 48.5%. The replacement rate a
is set at 40%, which is quite realistic for Dutch occupational pension schemes.11 The wage rate
Y is normalized at unity so that consumption and leisure have the same order of dimension in the
utility function.
We assume that the annual mean of the equity return is 5%, implying a risk premium of 3%
per year. The standard deviation of the annual equity return is set at 20%. To construct
twenty-year shocks, we transform the annual mean and variance of the lognormal distribution
(of equity returns) to the corresponding moments of the normal distribution (of log equity
returns).12 Then we calculate twenty-year log returns as the sum of twenty randomly chosen
yearly log returns. To reduce the sample variation, these twenty-year log returns are scaled in a
uniform way to ensure that their mean and standard deviation are equal to the theoretical values.
5.3 Baseline results
Since the wage rate is normalized at unity, variables like consumption (C1 andC2) and the stock
of risky assets of the pension fund (N) can be interpreted as percentages of the wage rate.
11 In the Netherlands, an individual with an average income level and an unbroken career typically has a (gross)
replacement rate of 70%, which consists for about 30%-points of (ﬁrst pillar) PAYG public pensions and for 40%-points of
(second pillar) funded occupational pensions.




















28Table 5.2 Simulation results in the benchmark economy
C1 C2 L a lhS N x
Individual DC
expectation 39.4 37.8 39.4 24.9 5.3
10% quantile 39.4 27.2 39.4 24.9 5.3
90% quantile 39.4 52.4 39.4 24.9 5.3
Collective DB: proportional
expectation 47.0 45.5 39.4 24.9 6.3 10.2 7.0
10% quantile 33.9 26.0 39.4 24.9 4.6
90% quantile 65.2 69.9 39.4 24.9 8.8
Collective DB: lump sum
expectation 44.1 44.7 43.9 24.9 6.2 11.2 7.8
10% quantile 35.9 26.5 35.9 24.9 4.7
90% quantile 55.2 67.5 55.2 24.9 8.3
Results are based on 2,000 simulations and expressed in percentages. The wage rate Y is normalized at unity.
Table 5.2 shows the simulation results for the benchmark parameterization. The table shows
results for the private economy (which we denote as an individual DC system) and the economy
with a collective DB scheme, whereby it distinguishes between proportional and lump sum
intergenerational transfers.13 The table reports expected outcomes and 10% and 90% quantiles.
Note ﬁrst that in all situations, regardless of whether there is a funded DB scheme or not,
agents invest the same percentage (24.9%) of lifetime income in the risky asset. Because the
pension beneﬁt is safe, the asset span of households in the presence of collective pensions is the
same as that in the private economy resulting in equivalent lifetime portfolio choices.
In the private economy and the DB pension economy with lump sum transfers, in which
labour market distortions are absent, the marginal rate of substitution between ﬁrst-period
consumption and leisure equals the gross wage rate. Since we assume that agents spend the same
fraction of total expenditures on both goods (h = 0:5), ﬁrst-period consumption (expressed as
percentage of the wage rate) and leisure should then be equal to each other. This is only
approximately true in the case of lump sum transfers. This is due to the fact that leisure cannot
exceed the value of one. This boundary constraint is binding in case of an extremely large shock
in the excess return on the risky asset. The numerical effect of this boundary constraint is, as
Table 5.2 shows, very small however.
The introduction of the collective pension scheme does not change labour supply due to our
assumption of a unitary elasticity of intratemporal substitution. However, compared to the
private economy, the introduction of the pension scheme does increase the expected
consumption levels in the ﬁrst and second period. At the same time, it also raises the risk born
by each generation as reﬂected by the wider 80%-conﬁdence intervals of both ﬁrst-period and
13 In the following, if we do not explicitly mention how transfers are ﬁnanced, we refer to the pension scheme with
proportional premiums on labour income.
29Figure 5.1 Distribution of the intergenerational transfer





















second-period consumption. The intuition is that the risk sharing provided by the pension
scheme increases lifetime wealth of consumers which leads them, in turn, to raise their demand
for risky assets (lhS) from 5.3% to an average level of 6.3%. Hence, in our small open economy
setting, the beneﬁt of risk sharing is not to reduce risk but rather to increase the expected payoff
from risky investments by generations who have not entered the labour market yet. Cui et al.
(2006), Bovenberg et al. (2007) and Gollier (2008) also point to this effect of intergenerational
risk sharing.
Consumers can only capture the equity premium in the ﬁrst period if they choose to work in
this period. In this way, the equity premium acts as a subsidy on labour supply. Indeed, leisure is
about 4.5%-points lower than if transfers were ﬁnanced lump sum, while average ﬁrst-period
consumption is about 3%-points higher. The distortionary effect of the intergenerational
payments leads to a slightly lower investment in the risky asset by the pension fund: in case of
lump sum transfer, risk taking by the pension fund is 10.2%, while in case of proportional
transfers it is 11.2%. We have already shown that this result holds analytically for a speciﬁc
version of the model. It also holds for a more general case however: labour market distortions
reduce the risk-bearing capacity of consumers.14
The pension scheme involves a signiﬁcant ex ante Pareto improvement. The
income-equivalent variation amounts 7%.15 The income-equivalent variation in case of lump
14 See Mehlkopf (2009) for a similar result.
15 If we compute the income-equivalent variation from the analytical solution, equation (3.22), we obtain a welfare gain
of 7.9%.
30sum transfers is 7.8%. This means that the distortionary effect of income-related transfers is
0.8%-point, roughly 10% of the pure welfare gain from risk sharing.
Within our intergenerational risk-sharing contract, any transfer between generations is
positive in expectation, but it can be negative for some bad states of the world. In principle,
consumers are only willing to participate in the contract if the initial loss is not larger than the
expected gains from risk sharing. We have avoided this discontinuity issue by imposing
mandatory participation, but it is still useful to analyse the sustainability of the contract under
voluntary participation. Figure 5.3 show the histogram of the intergenerational transfer as
percentage of the wage rate. The expected transfer is positive and equal to 19% of the wage rate,
but there is a probability of 40% that agents enter the pension contract with a negative transfer.
The proﬁts are generally much larger than the losses: the average loss agents incur is 10% of the
wage rate, while the average proﬁt amounts to 39% of the wage rate. Note that the minimum
transfer is bounded at a value of about 25%.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we check the robustness of the baseline result by solving the model for alternative
parameter values. We will solve for the income-equivalent variation in the presence of
proportional and lump sum transfers in order to be able to calculate the size of the labour market
distortion. We consider alternative values for the time discount factor (b), the inverse of the
intertemporal substitution elasticity (g), the preference parameter for leisure (h), the equity
premium (¯ m), the standard deviation of the excess return (s) and the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion (q). The ﬁndings are shown in Table 5.3. To make a comparison of the results easier,
we consider for each parameter reported a value change of +50% and  50% compared to the
baseline value.
Consistent with equation (3.22), the computed income-equivalent variations do not depend
on the time discount factor or the intertemporal substitution elasticity in case of proportional
transfers.16 In case of lump sum transfers, however, the income-equivalent variation increases
(decreases) if the time discount factor decreases (increases). Recall that the labour market
distortion only affects the intratemporal decision between consumption and leisure in the ﬁrst
period because in the second period people do not work at all. As a result, the distortion
increases for lower values of b and decreases for higher values of b, although quantitatively this
effect is very small.
The welfare effects of changes in the leisure parameter and in the degree of risk aversion are
similar in size. Note ﬁrst that the welfare gain is decreasing with the coefﬁcient of relative risk
16 Given that the welfare gain is not very sensitive to changes in the intertemporal substitution elasticity, we lose not much
generality if we would conﬁne the analysis to the standard expected utility formation instead of non-expected utility. At this
stage, however, we prefer to use the more general non-expected utility framework.
31Table 5.3 Sensitivity analysis: welfare gains
Parameter Value Proportional Lump sum Distortion
b 0.4 7.0 7.9 − 0.9
0.8 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
1.2 7.0 7.7 − 0.7
g 1.1 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
2.0 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
3.0 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
h 0.25 5.1 5.3 − 0.2
0.50 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
0.75 11.3 15.3 − 4.1
q 2.5 13.2 16.5 − 3.2
5.0 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
7.5 4.8 5.1 − 0.3
¯ m 0.015 1.5 1.7 − 0.2
0.030 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
0.045 17.8 19.8 − 2.0
s 0.1 36.3 42.3 − 5.9
0.2 7.0 7.8 − 0.8
0.3 2.2 2.5 − 0.2
Results are based on 2,000 simulations. All equivalent variations are expressed as percentages (of the wage rate), with benchmark
parameters marked as .
aversion, a result already derived in the analytical exposition. For lower degrees of risk aversion,
the pension fund takes more risk which raises the scope for risk sharing (and hence, welfare). On
the contrary, the income-equivalent variation is increasing in the leisure parameter h. If h
increases (decreases), the welfare gain increases (decreases) because the average subsidy the
pension scheme provides increases (decreases) as a percentage of labour income. At the same
time, an increase in h also increases the volatility of the intergenerational payments, which
widens the gap between the income-equivalent variation in case of proportional transfers and
lump sum transfers.
The income-equivalent variation is very sensitive to changes in the equity premium and the
standard deviation of the excess return. The increase (decrease) of the equity premium with 1.5
%-point raises the welfare gain by almost 11%-points (5.5%-points). A 50%-increase of the
standard deviation of the yearly excess return from 20% to 30%, in turn, reduces the
income-equivalent variation from 7% to 2.2%. A 50%-decrease of the standard deviation,
however, increases the welfare gain to more than 36%.
Calculated for a wide range of realistic parameter values, the welfare gain has a large spread
of possible values; it varies somewhere between 2% and 36% of the wage rate. Most
importantly, the ﬁgures in Table 5.3 show that the welfare gains from risk sharing in a funded
32DB scheme are large compared to the labour market distortion associated with the
intergenerational payments. Still, the welfare costs of labour market distortions are not
negligible. For some cases, the fraction of surplus that is eroded by distortions is almost 30%.
5.5 Simulations with CES utility
So far, we have assumed that the intratemporal substitution elasticity between consumption and
leisure (1=r) is unity, implying an uncompensated labour supply elasticity (e) of zero (see
Appendix A.5 for the relationship between the two). Actually, there is a lot of evidence
suggesting a non-zero labour supply elasticity (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an
overview). Evers et al. (2008) use 30 different studies to construct a data set of empirical
estimates of the uncompensated labour supply elasticity. They show that the mean elasticity of
men equals 0.07, while for women it equals 0.34. Mean elasticities for men range between
 0.08 and 0.18. For women, mean elasticities range between 0.03 and 2.79. To capture the
empirical evidence regaring the labour supply elasticity, we present simulation results for
different values for the intratemporal substitution elasticity.
Table 5.4 Results with CES utility: individual DC scheme
1=r C1 L a
0.5 36.8 36.8 17.7
1.0 39.4 39.4 24.9
2.0 41.9 41.9 37.9
Results are based on 2,000 simulations.
Table 5.4 reports the simulation results for the private economy and Table 5.5 shows the
simulation results for the economy with DB pensions. In Appendix A.5 we formally show that
the labour supply elasticity is positive if the intratemporal labour supply elasticity is larger than
unity, zero if it is equal to unity and negative if the intratemporal substitution elasticity is smaller
than unity. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show simulation results for three different values for the
intratemporal substitution elasticity, corresponding to an interval for e that ranges from  0.2 to
0.3.
If the labour supply elasticity is unequal to zero, the income and substitution effect on leisure
are different so that labour supply and portfolio allocation become state-dependent. For
example, suppose e > 0, then agents will work less hours if they are confronted with a positive
recovery rate (pc > 0) implying that they build up less pension rights to ﬁnance future
consumption. To compensate for this, agents take more risk by investing a larger share of total
wealth in the risky asset (higher a).
Compared to the private economy, consumption is higher in the DB pension economy,
reﬂecting the welfare gain from risk sharing. The average level of labour supply, instead, is
33Table 5.5 Results with CES utility: collective DB scheme
Proportional transfer Lump sum transfer
1=r e C1 L a N C1 L a N
0.5 expectation − 0.2 42.3 38.4 18.1 9.7 41.2 41.1 18.0 10.2
10% quantile − 0.2 33.0 35.3 17.4 9.7 33.7 33.7 17.4 10.2
90% quantile − 0.2 55.3 42.9 19.1 9.7 51.4 51.4 18.8 10.2
1.0 expectation 0.0 47.0 39.4 24.9 10.2 44.1 43.9 24.9 11.2
10% quantile 0.0 33.9 39.4 24.9 10.2 35.9 35.9 24.9 11.2
90% quantile 0.0 65.2 39.4 24.9 10.2 55.2 55.2 24.9 11.2
2.0 expectation 0.3 51.8 39.5 36.6 9.7 46.9 46.7 36.5 12.2
10% quantile 0.3 33.2 31.8 32.4 9.7 38.2 38.2 32.0 12.2
90% quantile 0.4 76.8 45.7 40.2 9.7 58.6 58.6 39.9 12.2
Results are based on 2,000 simulations.
higher if the labour supply elasticity is positive and lower if this elasticity is negative. Recall that
the pension scheme enables agents to capture the equity premium already in the ﬁrst period. In
this way, the pension scheme stimulates labour supply if e > 0 (the substitution effect dominates
the income effect) and depresses labour supply if e < 0 (vice versa).
The fourth and ﬁfth column of Table 5.5 reveal that the levels of consumption and leisure are
diverging in the DB pension economy for higher levels of the intratemporal substitution
elasticity, reﬂecting the fact that the two goods become closer substitutes. In addition, since the
substitution effect on leisure becomes more dominant relative to the income effect, consumption
and leisure get also further away from the corresponding lump sum levels. As a consequence,
the distortionary effect of the intergenerational transfers becomes larger for higher levels of the
intratemporal substitution elasticity which drives away the optimal equity investment of the
pension fund from the corresponding lump sum levels. For an intratemporal substitution
elasticity of 0.5, the equity investment of the pension fund is only 0.5%-points lower than in case
of lump sum transfers. When the intratemporal substitution elasticity is 2, however, this
difference has been increased to 2.5%-points.
But even if intratemporal substitution is high, the labour market distortion is quite modest
compared to the pure welfare gains of risk sharing. Figure 5.2 shows the welfare gain of risk
sharing as function of the intratemporal substitution elasticity. The displayed values of
substitution elasticities from (approximately) 0 to 3 correspond to an interval for the labour
supply elasticity that ranges between  0:4 and 0.7. The difference between the solid line
(corresponding to lump sum transfers) and the dashed line (corresponding to proportional
transfers) is the labour market distortion. The labour market distortion increases from 0% of the
wage rate to about 2.5% of the wage rate for a substitution elasticity of 3. The pure welfare gain
belonging to this high level of intratemporal substitution is 9.3%, hence, the labour market
34Figure 5.2 Welfare gain in case of CES utility







































distortion amounts more than one quarter of this percentage.17
5.6 Short-sale constraint consumers
Until now, we have assumed that agents do not face any borrowing or liquidity constraint. That
means, agents can take short positions in either the risky asset or the risk-free asset. In addition,
if that would be optimal, agents can choose to borrow in the ﬁrst period (negative private
savings) to optimally smooth consumption over the ﬁrst and second period. In practice, though,
it is often difﬁcult or even impossible for young people to take short positions in an asset,
because human capital alone does not collateralize major loans in modern economies for reasons
of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. To overcome this objection, this section solves
the model with a short-sale constraint for households, i.e. 0  lh;t  1. We do not have to
consider a non-negativity constraint on private savings because in the baseline scenario the
young’s optimal savings turn out to be always positive in the simulations.
In case there is no short-sale constraint, the size of the collective pension scheme in terms of
the exogenous accrual rate (a) does not play a role in the model. Any actions by the pension
scheme can be undone by the household. However, if there is a short-sale constraint, the size of
the pension sector will matter because there is a possibility that agents cannot offset the decision
17 As an additional check, we have also calculated the sensitivity of the labour market distortion for changes in the
intratemporal substitution elasticity keeping constant the ratio between ﬁrst-period and second-period consumption at the
baseline level. To that end, we considered several model parameters to recalibrate this consumption ratio. In all cases,
these modiﬁcations hardly changed the welfare effects as represented in Figure 5.2.
35Table 5.6 Short selling versus no short selling
lh lp x
Baseline
expectation 136.9 62.2 7.0
10% quantile 46.3 62.2
90% quantile 227.8 62.2
No short selling
expectation 80.5 59.2 6.7
10% quantile 47.1 59.1
90% quantile 100.0 59.2
Results are based on 2,000 simulations and expressed in percentages.
of the pension fund. In our DB pension scheme, whose size is based on Dutch evidence, it is
indeed true that the implementation of a short-sale constraint restricts household behaviour in
some states. We already discussed that for the benchmark parameterization agents invest 25% of
total wealth in the risky asset. As a percentage of ﬁnancial wealth, however, this equity
investment is much larger in the economy with a funded DB scheme. Table 5.6 shows that the
equity investment is 137% of ﬁnancial wealth in the expected path, which means that agents take
short positions in the risk-free asset on average.
The introduction of the short-sale constraint reduces the risk exposure considerably: the
expected value of lh declines from 136.9% to 80.5% and the 90% quantile decreases from
227.8% to the threshold value of 100%. The pension fund does not take short positions. In the
baseline scenario the pension fund invests 62.2% of the collected contributions in the risky asset.
In case of a short-sale constraint, it is optimal to decrease this share to 59.2%. As discussed in
Section 3.1, agents are inclined to take short positions if there are funding deﬁcits (pc > 0) to
ensure that the fraction of their risky asset holdings in total wealth will not change. However,
when agents are not allowed to do this, a welfare-maximizing pension fund takes care of this by
investing a smaller amount in stocks. This investment strategy decreases the probability of
funding surpluses and deﬁcits, and hence, the probability that the short-sale constraint will bind
the household. The welfare consequences of the inability to take short positions are modest: the
income equivalence decreases with only 0.3%-points.
5.7 Labour income tax
In general, the labour supply decision is determined by the total marginal tax burden which is
not only affected by implicit taxes or subsidies in collective pension schemes but also by explicit
labour income taxes. In the model analysed so far, we have ignored the role of labour income
taxation. This section investigates how the introduction of a funded DB pension scheme affects
individual welfare if there is already an initial labour income tax in the economy. We consider
36Table 5.7 Welfare effects in case of labour income taxation
Without lump sum transfer With lump sum transfer
1=r t = 0 t = 0:2 t = 0:3 t = 0:4 t = 0:2 t = 0:3 t = 0:4
0.5 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.9 6.4 6.3 6.1
1.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.4 6.0
2.0 7.1 7.6 7.9 8.3 6.1 5.5 4.9
Results are based on 2,000 simulations and expressed in percentages.
two different cases: in the ﬁrst case the government spends the tax revenues on services from
which the consumer does not derive utility while in the second case tax revenues are
redistributed back in the form of lump sum income transfers. Hence, in the ﬁrst case the labour
income tax has a substitution and income effect, in the second case it only has a substitution
effect. We analyse the welfare implications for a labour income tax rate (t) of 20%, 30% and
40% and for different values of the intratemporal substitution elasticity.
Table 5.7 shows the results. Consider ﬁrst the case without lump sum redistribution of the
collected tax revenues, the left panel of the table. Note that in the benchmark parameterization
with a substitution elasticity of unity the welfare gain is independent of labour income
taxation.18 If r = 1 the income and substitution effects cancel against each other so that the
labour supply decision is not affected by labour income taxation. For substitution elasticities
below unity, however, the welfare gain of the funded pension scheme is lower in case there is an
initial tax distortion. In this case, the income effect dominates the substitution effect implying
that labour supply in the economy is higher if t > 0 compared to t = 0. Consequently, if there is
an initial tax distortion, the welfare-improving intergenerational transfers associated with the
risk-sharing contract decrease as percentage of net disposable labour income. This reduces the
scope for risk sharing, resulting in lower welfare gains. If the substitution elasticity is higher
than unity, instead, the opposite holds. In this case income taxation reduces labour supply
incentives which relatively increases the welfare-improving intergenerational transfers.
Concentrating on the case in which the government redistributes the collected tax receipts
using lump sum payments, the right panel of Table 5.7, it follows that the welfare gain of the
pension scheme is unambiguously lower if t > 0 compared to t = 0. Labour income taxation
introduces an additional (negative) substitution effect on labour supply which reduces the
risk-bearing capacity of consumers. The optimizing pension fund responds to this by therefore
reducing its equity exposure, resulting in lower welfare gains.
18 This can also be proved formally. If r = 1, we have that ˜ lp;t = (1 t)lp;t, where ˜ lp;t denotes the optimal equity
investment of the pension fund in case of an initial income tax rate t. Substituting this expression in the condition for xt,





, we obtain equation (A.13), which does not depend on t
anymore.
37386 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a stylized two-period overlapping-generations model to
investigate the welfare gains from intergenerational risk sharing in collective funded pension
schemes. We have analysed the welfare implications of collective funded pensions both in terms
of risk sharing and in terms of labour market distortions. To that end, we have contructed a
pension scheme with deﬁned beneﬁts related to previous working life and with contributions
contingent on the capital-market shock. This funded DB scheme creates opportunities for
intergenerational risk sharing that agents cannot offset through transactions in ﬁnancial markets.
In our model, the pension fund facilitates intergenerational risk sharing by allowing the young
generation to trade in equity before it is born. As the contingent intergenerational transfers in
this pension scheme relate to labour income, they also distort the labour-leisure decision.
We have analytically shown for a Cobb-Douglas felicity function that a funded DB scheme
involves an ex ante Pareto improvement, implying that the welfare gains from risk sharing
outweigh the negative effect regarding labour market distortions. Using numerical simulations,
we showed that this result also holds under a more general CES felicity function. In terms of
income-equivalent variation, the welfare gain of risk sharing can be quite substantial, varying
somewhere between 2% and 36%. We have also shown that a funded DB scheme may change
labour supply, because the pension contract changes the price of leisure. To the earlier literature
that emphasizes that risk sharing may be reﬂected in a higher average portfolio rate of return, our
paper thus adds that risk sharing may also affect labour supply.
Our ﬁndings are relevant for the debate on worldwide pension reforms. Due to increasing
demographic pressure, various countries have moved or are considering to move away from
collective funded DB schemes towards individual funded DC schemes. Our result emphasizes
that the loss this implies in terms of reduced intergenerational risk sharing may be far more
important than the gain that is due to reduced labour market distortions.
While our model allows studying the welfare effects of collective pensions, it has its
limitations. It restricts intergenerational risk sharing to two generations only. Because one model
period represents twenty years, shocks can maximally be smoothed out over a period of fourthy
years. One might argue that this time span is relatively short. Extending risk-sharing possibilities
to more generations will increase the welfare gains from risk sharing.19 In this respect, our
calculated welfare gain can be viewed as a lower bound of the potential gains of risk sharing.
We have abstracted from stochastic labour productivity. Accounting for the stochastic nature
19 Increasing the risk-sharing possibilities could be implemented in the model by spreading risks over an inﬁnite number of
generations. However, extending the model along this line is numerically much more demanding. For a particular version
of the model (i.e. when per-period utility has a Cobb-Douglas form and transfers are income-related) this problem is
analytically well-deﬁned. It gives a welfare gain of 8.7%, which is only 1.7%-points higher than if risk sharing is restricted
to two generations. Hence, alleviation of this restriction does not seem to add much potential for welfare improvement.
39of labour productivity would enhance the role of the pension scheme, which then would not only
share equity return risks across generations, but also labour productivity risks. This would
increase the scope for risk sharing. This also suggests that our analysis underestimates the
welfare gain from funded DB schemes. Furthermore, as riskless assets are rarely seen in practice,
a model with two types of risky assets to describe equity and bonds could be more realistic. In
such a world, pension schemes would be even more attractive, as they provide nonstochastic
beneﬁts which households cannot obtain if pension funds are absent. This adds to our claim that
our result on the welfare gain of collective pension schemes should not be interpreted literally.
40References
Attanasio, O. and G. Weber, 1995, Is consumption growth consistent with intertemporal
optimization? Evidence for the consumer expenditure survey, Journal of Political Economy,
103(6):1121–1157.
Barberis, N., 2000, Investing for the long run when returns are predictable, Journal of Finance,
55:225–264.
Beetsma, R., W. Romp, and S. Vos, 2008, Intergenerational risk sharing, pensions and
endogenous labor supply in general equilibrium, Working Paper, CESifo.
Blundell, R., M. Browning, and C. Meghir, 1994, Consumer demand and the life cycle allocation
of household expenditures, The Review of Economic Studies, 61(1):57–80.
Blundell, R. and T. MaCurdy, 1999, Labor supply: a review of alternative approaches, in
O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, 1559–1695, Amsterdam,
North Holland.
Bodie, Z., R. Merton, and W. Samuelson, 1992, Labor supply ﬂexibility and portfolio choice in a
life cycle model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16:427–449.
Bovenberg, L., R. Koijen, T. Nijman, and C. Teulings, 2007, Saving and investing over the life
cycle and the role of collective pension funds, De Economist, 155(4):347–415.
Campbell, J. Y. and L. M. Viceira, 2002, Strategic Asset Allocation; Portfolio Choice for
Long-Term Investors, Oxford University Press.
Choi, K. J. and G. Shim, 2006, Disutility, optimal retirement, and portfolio selection,
Mathematical Finance, 16(2):443–467.
Cui, J., F. de Jong, and E. Ponds, 2006, Intergenerational risk sharing within funded pension
schemes, Working Paper, Netspar, University of Tilburg.
Draper, N. and E. Westerhout, 2009, Privatizing pensions: more than an interesting thought?,
Mimeo, Banca d’ Italia.
Epstein, L. G. and S. E. Zin, 1991, Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of
41consumption and asset returns: an empirical analysis, Journal of Political Economy,
99(2):263–286.
Evers, M., R. de Mooij, and D. van Vuuren, 2008, The wage elasticity of labour supply: a
synthesis of empirical estimates, De Economist, 156(1):25–43.
Farhi, E. and S. Panageas, 2007, Saving and investing for early retirement: a theoretical analysis,
Journal of Financial Economics, 83:87–121.
Fehr, H. and C. Habermann, 2008, Risk sharing and efﬁciency implications of progressive
pension arrangements, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2):419–443.
Gollier, C., 2008, Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund, Journal of
Public Economics, 92:1463–1485.
Gordon, R. H. and H. R. Varian, 1988, Intergenerational risk sharing, Journal of Public
Economics, 37:185–202.
Gottardi, P. and F. Kubler, 2006, Social security and risk sharing, Mimeo, University of Venice.
Krueger, D. and F. Kubler, 2006, Pareto-improving social security reform when ﬁnancial
markets are incomplete!?, American Economic Review, 96(3):737–755.
Matsen, E. and Ø. Thøgersen, 2004, Designing social security - a portfolio choice approach,
European Economic Review, 48(4):883–904.
Mehlkopf, R., 2009, Labor supply distortions of pension fund recovery policies, Mimeo,
University of Tilburg.
Merton, R. C., 1969, Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous time case,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 51:247–257.
Miles, D. and A. ˘ Cerný, 2006, Risk, return and portfolio allocation under alternative pension
systems with incomplete and imperfect ﬁnancial markets, The Economic Journal, 116:529–557.
Nishiyama, S. and K. Smetters, 2007, Does social security privatization produce efﬁciency
gains?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122:1677–1719.
42Samuelson, P. A., 1969, Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic programming,
Review of Economic and Statistics, 51(3):239–246.
Sánchez-Marcos, V. and A. R. Sánchez-Martín, 2006, Can social security be welfare improving
when there is demographic uncertainty, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control,
30:1615–1646.
Sandmo, A., 1970, The effect of uncertainty on savings decisions, Review of Economic Studies,
3:353–360.
Teulings, C. N. and C. G. de Vries, 2006, Generational accounting, solidarity and pension losses,
De Economist, 154:63–83.
Towers Watson, 2010, Global pension asset study 2010.
van Hemert, O., 2005, Optimal intergenerational risk sharing, Mimeo, University of Amsterdam.
4344Appendix A Derivations
In this appendix we derive equation (3.6), equation (3.9), equation (3.22) and equations
(4.7)-(4.9). We also derive the labour supply elasticity (e) reported in Table 5.5.
A.1 Portfolio allocation households
Following Campbell and Viceira (2002), we assume that both 1+RT;t+1 and
(1+Re;t+1)=(1+Rf) are lognormally distributed. If a variable X is lognormally distributed,
then there holds:
























Vartre;t+1 rf = zCovt (rT;t+1;re;t+1) (A.2)
As the return on the portfolio is a linear combination of the return on stocks and the return on
bonds, see equation (2.3), and the log of a linear combination is not the same as a linear
combination of logs, we follow Campbell and Viceira (2002) and use a Taylor approximation of
the nonlinear function relating log individual-asset returns to log portfolio returns. First note that
equation (3.3) can be written as:




















Now we take a second-order Taylor expansion of f() around re;t+1 rf = 0, which gives:








From equation (A.4) it follows:
Covt (rT;t+1;re;t+1) = atVartre;t+1 (A.5)
Substituting equation (A.5) into (A.2) then gives:
at =










Vartre;t+1 = s2 (A.8)
Note from equation (A.1) that:









Inserting equations (A.7)-(A.9) in equation (A.6) gives equation (3.6).
Note that for small x we have that log(1+x)  x. Then it follows from (A.9) that ¯ m is
approximately equal to the excess return:


















where the two  signs are associated with small s2 and small E(Re). Hence, s2 is
approximately equal to the variance of the (excess) equity return.
A.2 Certainty-equivalent rate of return













with ¯ r  log(1+ ¯ R). Using equation (A.4), the term kt can be rewritten to:













Inserting equation (A.6) into (A.11) and rearranging gives:


















Inserting equation (A.12) in equation (A.10), and again using the fact that log(1+x)  x, we
obtain equation (3.9).
46A.3 Welfare gain
Substituting the indirect utility function (3.17) in the objective function of the pension fund,



















































Taking logs on both sides gives:
(1 z)log(1+xt)+(1 z)rf = kt (A.14)
Substituting equation (A.12) in (A.14) and (again) using the approximation log(1+x)  x, we
obtain equation (3.22).
A.4 Labour market distortion
For log-linear lifetime utility (i.e. g = q = r = 1) we are able to solve the model with lump sum
transfers analytically. In that case, it follows from equation (3.7) that Z = b and, hence, does not
depend on leisure anymore. Lifetime utility equals,
Ut = (1 h)logC1;t +hlogLt +b(1 h)Et logC2;t+1
Substituting equation (4.3)-(4.5) in this expression gives the following indirect utility function:
Vt = F  hlogY +[1+b(1 h)]log(Y +Tt) (A.15)
F  (1 h)(1+b)log(1 h)+hlogh +b(1 h)logb +b(1 h)Et rT;t+1
 [1+b(1 h)]log[1+b(1 h)]














































To derive the welfare gain of the pension scheme in the presence of lump sum transfers, we need
to solve for the additional amount of income (xL) an agent in the situation without a pension










From equation (A.15) it follows:
V0
t (Y) = (1 h)(1+b)logY +F (A.21)
V1
t (Y) = F  hlogY +[1+b(1 h)]log(Y +Tt) (A.22)
Inserting equation (A.21) and (A.22) in equation (A.20) then gives:
(1 h)(1+b)log(1+xL














Using equation (A.3) and (A.17), this expression can be simpliﬁed to:
(1 h)(1+b)log(1+xL





Using equations (A.4), (A.6) and (A.7)-(A.9), it follows that:

















Equation (A.25) and (3.22) determine the labour market distortion xD  x  xL mentioned in
equation (4.9).
48A.5 Labour supply elasticity
This section derives the uncompensated labour supply elasticity, as shown in Table 5.5. To that











Approximating f() with a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around the point (logC1;t;logLt) = (0;0)
gives:






























and y  r  (1 h)(r  g), z  r  (1 h)(r  q), w  1 h(r  g) and n deﬁned as in the
































































so we have that e > 0 if r < 1, e < 0 if r > 1 and e = 0 if r = 1.
4950Appendix B Accuracy of the simulations
Table B.1 shows the distribution of the income-equivalent variation for various sets of drawings.
As the number of drawings increase, the standard deviation of the computed welfare gains
declines from 0.21 (in case of 250 drawings) to 0.07 (in case of 2,000 drawings). The difference
between the maximum and minimum value decreases from 0.67%-points to 0.24%-points.
Running more simulations increases the accuracy of the results, but it also increases the
solvency time exponentially. Hence, we are forced to make a trade-off between accuracy on the
one hand and a feasible solvency time on the other hand. Our results in the text are based on
2,000 simulations. For this number of drawings the difference between the maximum and
minimum value of the income-equivalent variation will not exceed the 0.25%-points, which we
consider as a reasonable margin of error.
Table B.1 Accuracy simulations
Number of drawings
250 500 1000 2000
Mean 6.94 7.05 7.02 7.03
Median 6.89 7.00 7.04 7.03
Stdev 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.07
Min 6.61 6.75 6.78 6.92
Max 7.28 7.37 7.18 7.15
Reported statistics are based on 25 observations.
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